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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETIREMENT




In response to past abuses of the District of Columbia's pension system
by some police officers and firefighters,' Congress enacted the District of
Columbia Retirement Reform Act on November 17, 1979.2 Although the
disability provisions of the Act are designed to make the pension system
1. The disability provisions of the Act are a response to the disproportionate number
of disability retirees from the District's police and fire departments and the staggering cost to
the city of police and firefighter's retirement pensions. District of Columbia Pension Reform
Act: Hearing on S, 1813, S. 2316, HR. 6536 Before the Subcomm. on Governmental Efficiency
and the District of Columbia of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 660 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings] (statement of Edwin F. Boynton, Actu-
ary for the Wyatt Co.). Boynton's figures indicate the following comparisons between the
District of Columbia, New York City, Baltimore, and Los Angeles as to the number of
pension beneficiaries in 1975:
District of Los
Columbia Baltimore Angeles
Police New York City Police Police
& Fire Police Fire & Fire & Fire
1. Retired for Age $ 615 $ 9,836 $3,915 $ 493 $4,269
or
Servie
2. Retired for Disa- 2,904 1,772 106 642 1,021
bility
3. Survivors of 1,202 102 139 173 1.850
Deceased
Members
4. Total $4,721 $11,710 $4,610 $1,308 $7,140
Id. at 696. In 1978, it was projected that the District would have to pay an amount equal to
55% of its active payroll into the police and firefighter's retirement and disability plan. Id at
693. According to Boynton's projections, the cost of these pensions under the existing pay-
as-you-go system of funding would increase to 101% of the active payroll in the year 2000.
Id See note 67 infra.
2. District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-122, 93 Stat. 866
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Retirement Reform Act of 1979]. The Act establishes a federally
assisted retirement fund for District police officers, firefighters, teachers, and judges, pro-
vides for management of the funds, and "provide[s] disability retirement benefits which
compare with other cities and provide the annuitant a sufficient retirement allowance while
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financially viable by minimizing the opportunity for fraudulent compensa-
tion claims, Congress may have overreacted to the past abuses. In particu-
lar, the elimination of the so-called "aggravation" clause,3 which allowed
an inference of on-duty causation where proximate cause of a claimant's
injury was doubtful or shown to be outside the scope of employment but
aggravated in the performance of duty, appears to have foreclosed the op-
portunity for many bona fide claimants to recover deserved disability pen-
sions. This Comment will examine the evolution of the aggravation
provision, its application in practice, the reasons for its repeal, and the
effect that its elimination will have on police officers and firefighters who
are disabled by the on-duty aggravation of a preexisting condition.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISABILITY RETIREMENT PROVISIONS
GOVERNING POLICE OFFICERS AND FIREFIGHTERS IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Every police officer and firefighter is aware that a violent occupational
incident could result in a lifetime disability or even death. The risk of such
injury is inherent in the hazardous nature of the work and must be faced
by police officers and firefighters every day on the job.4 Death or serious
injury, however, represent only two aspects of these hazards. These civil
servants may also become disabled through the more subtle and prevalent
conditions incident to their inherently extreme working conditions.' For
example, irregular working hours and anxiety about the constant risks of
the job put unusual pressures on the physical health of employees as well
as emotional strains on their familial relationships.6 Additionally, police
keeping pension costs at a level the District can afford." S. REP. No. 237, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1979).
3. D.C. CODE § 4-527(2) (1973 & Supp. 1978).
4. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 135-48 (Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters' "Annual
Death and Injury Survey" for 1975 and 1976). These reports illustrate the alarming number
of firefighters killed or injured in on-the-job accidents or from occupational diseases every
year.
5. "Police duty frequently has an adverse effect on the state of one's health." Id at
184 (statement of Joseph S. Goldring, President, Police Ass'n of the District of Columbia).
Goldring cited working outdoors in all types of weather, stress, harassment, and other duty-
related factors as contributing to the fact that "police officers are more susceptible to condi-
tions such as arthritis, high blood pressure, heart disease, ulcers and nervous disorders than
are most citizens." Id
6. Financing Retirement Funds/or Police, Firemen, Teachers, and Judges." Hearings on
HR. 2465 and HR. 6536 Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal and Government Affairs and the
House Comm. on the District of Columbia, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 255, 258 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Hearings] (statement of Joseph S. Goldring). Police officers and firefighters do
not work normal hours and do not always receive holidays which coincide with those of
their families and friends. Also, a police officer or firefighter and his spouse are constantly
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officers and firefighters are subject to many other unique stresses 7 that may
lead to serious "diseases of adaptation."8
Recognizing that an adequate and equitable retirement plan for these
types of disabilities is an important element for the maintenance of a qual-
ity police and firefighting force, 9 the District of Columbia, prior to the pas-
sage of the Retirement Reform Act of 1979, had one of the most liberal
pension systems in the country.' ° Besides providing these high risk em-
subjected to anxiety stemming from uncertainty about what hazards each day on the job
might entail. Id.
7. Stresses generated by police work include the suspicious nature an officer must de-
velop in order to survive, having to deal with crisis situations, having to make life and death
decisions, fear, hostile public attitudes, and even boredom from the routine aspects of the
job. Holt, Coping With the Special Stresses of Police Work, Wash. Star, Feb. 14, 1978, § A,
at 1, col. 1. Firefighters labor under many of the same types of stressful conditions.
8. Stressful conditions may contribute to or lead to such "diseases of adaptation" as
"heart attacks, hypertension, ulcers, kidney disorders, allergic reactions, insomnia, head-
aches and other ailments [and may] also [cause] emotional disturbances which may lead to
divorce, alcoholism, drug abuse and suicide." Id at col. 3-4. Holt reported that "Police
Administrators are becoming more concerned about the escalating costs in paid sick leave
and compensation and disability pensions, much of which are stress related." 1d. at col. 5.
Many police departments around the country have set up special programs to deal with
problems of stress. Id.
9. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 711-23 (statement of Robert E. Peterson, Presi-
dent, Greater Washington Labor Council, AFL-CIO). Peterson noted that
in the case of firefighters and police, it is essential that a retirement system, which
protects the future financial security of individuals injured in the line of duty, be
supported. This protection is of paramount importance if the citizens of this City
are to expect D.C. fire fighters and police to expose themselves to high risk situa-
tions and perform dangerous, but essential, fire fighting and crime control maneu-
vers.
Id at 712.
10. 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 103 (statement of Edwin F. Boynton, Actuary, the
Wyatt Company). Figures taken from a United States Department of Commerce report
indicate the following comparisons of average monthly payments for the year 1975:
District of Los
Columbia Baltimore Angeles
Police New York City Police Police
& Fire Police Fire & Fire & Fire
1. Retired for Age $1,225 $ 585 $ 676 $ 423 $ 720
or
Service
2. Retired for Disa- 1,225 585 545 538 598
bility
3. Survivors of 449 585 619 193 709
Deceased
Members
4. Average of Total $1,027 $ 585 $ 671 $ 449 $ 700
Monthly
Payments
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ployees with peace of mind, the generous disability compensation provi-
sions were a valuable recruiting tool for the District." The liberality of the
pension program encouraged abuse, however, and for a time it appeared
that practically anyone could retire on the basis of disability. Such abuse
placed a severe strain on the city's budget. 12 The proportion of annuitants
who retired under the disability retirement provisions, 13 as opposed to
those who retired on the basis of age or longevity of service, 14 was uncon-
scionably lopsided. In 1969, the situation reached an extreme when
ninety-eight percent of retiring police officers and ninety-nine percent of
retiring firefighters left the forces on the basis of disability.' 5 Although
that figure declined steadily thereafter, it was still over fifty percent in
19 7 7 .16
Id at 696 (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FINANCES OF EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 1974-1975 23-28 (1976)).
1I. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 271-75 (statement of Peter T. Lyons, Int'l Bhd.
of Police Officers). Lyons testified that "[tihe retirement benefits afforded this group of pro-
fessionals has been one of the main inducements in acquiring the caliber. . . of men and
women needed to maintain an efficient and effective police force." Id at 272-73. See also
District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act. Financing Retirement Funds/or Police, Firemen,
Teachers, and Judges.- Hearings on HR. 3560 and HR. 3939 Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal
Affairs and Health and the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 153, 155
(1979) (statement of Mayor Marion S. Barry, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings]. In
opposing drastic benefit changes which would be applicable to current District of Columbia
employees, Mayor Barry noted that "[t]he city's attractive retirement program has played a
central role in recruiting public safety employees, particularly during the massive buildup of
the police force that took place about ten years ago as a result of Presidential and Congres-
sional action." Id at 155. In fact, the pendency of pension reform measures in Congress
and the uncertainty of the outcome of legislation led a neighboring police force actively to
recruit experienced District of Columbia police officers, as that jurisdiction had recently
raised its retirement benefits to attractive levels. 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 257 (state-
ment of Joseph S. Goldring, President, Police Ass'n of the District of Columbia). •
12. The accrued unfunded pension liability of the District of Columbia was approxi-
mately $2.04 billion in 1977, of which $1.4 million was attributable to the police and
firefighter's pension system. 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 1. In 1977, the police and
firefighter's pension system made annuity payments which equalled 51.6% of the total active
payroll for those departments. Id See also note 67 infra.
13. D.C. CODE §§ 4-526, 4-527 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
14. D.C. CODE § 4-528 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
15. Pension Revision: A Must, Wash. Star, Feb. 26, 1978, § D, at 2, col. i.
16. Disability retirement percentages in the District of Columbia for the years 1969-
1977 were reported to Congress to be declining as follows:
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These relatively high rates of disability retirements in the District can be
attributed largely to the economic advantages disability annuities have
over regular retirement benefits and the previously liberal judicial and ad-
ministrative interpretations of the city's pension laws. A disability retire-
ment may be more advantageous to an annuitant than an age or length of
service retirement primarily for two reasons. First, disability retirement
benefits are not as highly taxed,17 making them more desirable than serv-
ice or age retirement payments even if those payments are higher. 18 Sec-
ond, under the former provisions, an annuitant who was disabled as a
result of an on-duty injury, disease, or aggravation of an injury or disease
received a minimum annuity of two-thirds of his average pay,' 9 whereas
an annuitant who had retired for age or length of service received only half











* It should be noted that "Data through 1972 represent board actions; data beginning 1973 rep-
resent actual requirements."
1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 658.
17. I.R.C. § 105(d).
18. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 662 (statement of Edwin F. Boynton, Actuary
for the Wyatt Company).
19. D.C. CODE § 4-527 (1973 & Supp. 1978). "Average pay" was defined as
the highest annual rate resulting from averaging the member's rates of basic salary
in effect over any twelve consecutive months of police or fire service, with each rate
weighted by the time it was in effect, except that if the member retires under section
4-527 and if on the date of his retirement. . . he has not completed twelve consec-
utive months of police or fire service, [average pay] means his basic salary at the
time of his retirement.
D.C. CODE § 4-521(17) (1973 & Supp. 1978).
20. D.C. CODE § 4-528 (1973 & Supp. 1978). Under former § 4-528, a member of the
police or fire department could, after 20 years of service, elect to take an optional retirement.
Benefits under this type of retirement were computed at a rate of 2 1/2% of the retiree's
average pay for each year of service (3% for each year over 20 years) with a maximum
annuity of 80% of average pay. On the other hand, a disability retirement under § 4-527 for
a disability received in the course of duty or aggravated by such duty was computed at a rate
of 2 1/2% of the retiree's average pay for each year of service, with a minimum of 66 2/3%
and a maximum of 70% of the retiree's average pay. Therefore, in order for service retire-
ment benefits to equal the minimum on-duty disability payments an officer or firefighter
19801
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Perhaps the prime reason for the disproportionate number of service-
related disability retirements in the District of Columbia, however, was the
"aggravation" provision of section 4-527 of the District of Columbia
Code.2' Enacted by Congress 22 to "create an additional category of serv-
ice-connected disability, ' 23 the aggravation clause ratified the approach
previously taken by the Court of Appeals 24 in cases where the precise
cause of disability was unclear.25 By explicitly allowing an inference of
would have to work for 25 1/2 years. Compare D.C. CODE § 4-527 with D.C. CODE § 4-528.
This does not take into consideration the tax benefit which the disability annuitant would
also gain. See notes 17-18 supra.
However, the provisions for retirement on the basis of a disability not incurred nor aggra-
vated in the course of duty were not as generous. D.C. CODE § 4-526 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
Annuitants who had completed at least 5 years service were eligible for a minimum pension
of 40% of average pay or 2% for each year of service up to a maximum of 70% of average
pay. This section, like § 4-527, provided a minimum percentage regardless of the extent or
nature of the disabling condition. D.C. CODE §§ 4-526, 4-527 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
21. D.C. CODE § 4-527(2) (1973 & Supp. 1978) reads, in pertinent part:
(2) In any case in which the proximate cause of an injury incurred or disease con-
tracted by a member is doubtful, or is shown to be other than the performance of
duty, and such injury or disease is shown to have been aggravated by the perform-
ance of duty to such an extent that the member is permanently disabled for the
performance of duty, such disability shall be construed to have been incurred in
the .performance of duty.
Id.
22. Policemen and Firemen's Retirement and Disability Act Amendment of 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-857, 76 Stat. 1133 (current version at 93 Stat. 902 (1979)).
23. H.R. REP. No. 892, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961).
24. The District of Columbia Code provides for judicial review of decisions of agencies
of the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE § 1-1510 (1973 & Supp. 1978) provides that:
[any person suffering a legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an or-
der or decision of the Mayor or an agency in a contested case, is entitled to a
judicial review thereof. . . upon filing in the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals a written petition for review.
Id Decisions of the Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board are not exempt
from judicial review on the ground that they are not "contested cases." Johnson v. Board of
Appeals & Review, 282 A.2d 566, 568 (D.C. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Prior to
the Court Reform Act in the District of Columbia, this judicial review was conducted by the
United States District Court in the District of Columbia and the United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. See, e.g., Crawford v. McLaughlin, 286 F.2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1960). See also notes 39-40 and accompanying text infra. Since the court reform,
review has been conducted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. District of Co-
lumbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 111, 84
Stat. 475. See, e.g., Johnson v. Board of Appeals & Review, 282 A.2d 566 (D.C. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
25. See, e.g., Crawford v. McLaughlin, 286 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1960). In McLaughlin,
since the Court of Appeals found no evidence indicating that the appellant's back injury had
not grown out of an injury or disease incurred in the performance of duty, it held that the
record supported a disability retirement under § 4-527. Id at 822. The court did not require




on-duty causation in cases where the proximate cause of an injury was
doubtful or was shown to be outside the scope of employment but aggra-
vated in the performance of duty,26 the provision significantly eased the
burden of obtaining an annuity under section 4-527.27 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit viewed this amend-
ment as an endorsement of the rationale that the humane purpose of disa-
bility retirement provisions28 justified a liberal interpretation of those
provisions "in a light more favorable to the applicant seeking relief than in
the usual type of civil action."29
As if the aggravation clause of section 4-527 were not liberal enough,
however, judicial interpretation of the disability retirement laws made the
situation even more favorable to retiring employees. For instance, in
Blohm v. Tobriner,3° the federal court of appeals held that when disability
retirement proceedings were initiated by the police department against the
officer's will, the burden would be on the department to show that the
disability was not connected to an on-duty injury or disease.3 ' The court
also required that such evidence "clearly preponderate and be substantial
and persuasive."32 Later, the Blohm requirement was expanded to include
situations in which the retiree did not contest the fact that he was disabled
but was unwilling to concede that his disability was not incurred in the
performance of duty.3 3 Furthermore, in 1968, the circuit court in Wingo v.
26. D.C. CODE § 4-527(2) (1973 & Supp. 1978).
27. Id The District of Columbia Code permitted two types of disability retirements.
Under § 4-527, a disabled police officer or firefighter could be retired for a disability caused
by or aggravated by an injury or disease which occurred in the performance of duty. D.C.
CODE § 4-527 (1973 & Supp. 1978). However, if the disabling condition was neither caused
nor aggravated by duty-related factors, the retirement would be granted under § 4-526. D.C.
CODE § 4-526 (1973 & Supp. 1978). Benefits under these two provisions varied significantly,
making retirement under § 4-527 far more desirable for the annuitant.
28. See, e.g., Hyde v. Tobriner, 329 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Crawford v. Mc-
Laughlin, 286 F.2d 821, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Lynch v. Tobriner, 237 F. Supp. 313, 316
(D.D.C. 1965).
29. Hyde v. Tobriner, 329 F.2d 879, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
30. 350 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
31. Id at 786.
32. Id See also Carroll v. Tobriner, 535 F. Supp. 87, 88-89 (D.D.C. 1966) (Blohm test
applied where cause of disease was in doubt).
33. Monica v. Tobriner, 253 F. Supp. 851, 852-53 (D.D.C. 1966) ("physical injury to
and emotional stresses upon the plaintiff . . . definitely exacerbated the anxiety which
forced his retirement" thus meriting retirement under § 4-527). In Lynch v. Tobriner, 237 F.
Supp. 313 (D.D.C. 1965), the District Court had recognized that a duty-related disability
might result from emotional as well as physical trauma or injury. Id at 314-16. In arriving
at this decision, the court said:
The word "injury" is not limited to injuries caused by violence or physical force. It
must be given a broader and more liberal meaning. It includes any injury, or dis-
19801
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Washington34 elevated the Blohm requirement that evidence "clearly pre-
ponderate and be substantial and persuasive" 35 to the level of a presump-
tion of line-of-duty disability.36 Although Wingo practically created a
carte blanche license to receive a section 4-527 disability pension, the im-
pact of the decision proved to be short-lived.
Two Acts of Congress, while not specifically addressing the review of
Retirement Board decisions by the courts, had a direct effect upon such
review and resulted in a significant tightening of the availability of on-duty
disability retirements. The first of these was the District of Columbia Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act of 1968. 3 1 Section 11(3) of that Act signifi-
cantly relaxed the evidentiary standard applied in Wingo by requiring
administrative orders and decisions to be supported by "substantial evi-
dence in the record."' 38 This, of course, made it easier for the city to prove
a disability was not incurred in the line of duty, but its ramifications were
minor compared to the effect that the District of Columbia Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act of 197039 had on the interpretation of the
District's disability retirement provisions. Section 111 of that Act
amended Title 11 of the District of Columbia Code to give the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review administrative orders
and decisions.4" While the court reform itself had no impact on the inter-
pretation of the District's disability retirement provisions,4 review of Re-
tirement Board decisions by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
had a profound effect on the application of those provisions.
In Johnson v. Board of Appeals & Review,42 the District of Columbia
ease, or illness arising out of and in the course of the employment, which causes
incapacity. Such construction must be given in order that the humane purpose of
the law may be realized. Courts must keep in mind the benefits intended to be
conferred by the law.
Id at 316. The disability in Lynch was "emotional tension or stress syndrome" as evidenced
by "essential hypertension ... with uncontrolled elevations in blood pressure, and ...
hypertensive cardiovascular disease." Id at 315.
34. 395 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
35. 350 F.2d at 786.
36. 395 F.2d at 635. The court also required that the Retirement Board's findings be
supported by adequate evidence in the record. Id at 636.
37. Pub. L. No. 90-614, 82 Stat. 1203 (1968) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 1-1501 to -1510
(1973)).
38. D.C. CODE § 1-1510(3)(E) (1973).
39. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (codified in scattered sections of D.C. CODE (1973)).
40. D.C. CODE § 11-722 (1973).
41. D.C. CODE §§ 4-526 and 4-527 were not affected by the Court Reform Act of 1970.
42. 282 A.2d 566 (D.C. 1971). Because of common questions of law presented, the
Johnson decision consolidated two similar cases for the purpose of disposition. Id at 567.
Both petitioners were former members of the United States Park Service who had been
1000 [Vol. 29:993
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Court of Appeals held that, where the original cause of disability was
doubtful or outside the scope of employment, the burden was on the claim-
ant to prove that the initial injury or disease had been aggravated by on-
duty factors.43 In Johnson, the court of appeals reviewed two Retirement
Board decisions that had found no evidence of incidents or duty-related
circumstances to connect the claimants' disabilities with their services for
the Park Police.' Although both petitioners had asserted that on-duty
experiences had caused or aggravated their conditions, they were unable to
carry their burden of proof because of the tenuous character of their
claims.45 Under the previous federal rule placing the burden on the gov-
ernment to show that the disease or injury was not caused or aggravated
by incidents occurring in the performance of duty, 46 the claimants may
still have prevailed despite the paucity of their evidence. But, since the
D.C. Court of Appeals shifted this burden in Johnson, neither claimant
was successful.
The Johnson decision implicitly recognized the abuses of the disability
pension system, evidenced by the painstaking manner in which the court
finessed the Bohm47 and Wingo" precedents along with the legislative
retired by the Retirement Board for disabilities not incurred in the performance of duty. On
appeal, they both contended that their respective disabilities had been incurred or aggra-
vated in the course of duty. Id
43. Id. at 570.
44. Id at 569. In both cases, the Board of Appeals and Review had sustained those
findings. Id
45. Petitioner Johnson pointed to three specific experiences with the Park Police:
(1) his duty during the 1968 riots and demonstrations, (2) having to drop an assault
charge against a diplomat at the insistence of his commanding officer, and (3) be-
ing told in a "grufi' manner by his superior officer to go out and correct some 40
parking citations he had misdated earlier that day.
282 A.2d at 568. Petitioner Paxton pointed to such factors as the long hours he had served
during the 1968 riots, aggravation of his suspicious nature by virtue of detective work, and
his feelings of persecution by a superior officer who petitioner felt was "watch[ing] him
constantly, refus[ing] to give him credit for work done, and quibbl(ing] over minor discrep-
ancies in his reports" in an attempt to manufacture grounds for firing him. Id at 569.
46. Petitioners had cited both Blohm and Wingo to support this construction of the
aggravation provision. 282 A.2d at 570. See notes 30-36 and accompanying text supra.
47. 350 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The Johnson decision relied heavily on the language
of the aggravation provision of § 4-527(2) which it interpreted as "strongly suggesting" that
the burden was on the claimant to prove on-duty aggravation in cases where the original
causation was in doubt or admittedly outside the scope of duty. 282 A.2d at 570. The Court
distinguished Blohm as having involved a claimant who had made a showing that the origi-
nal injury had occurred on the job and said that, in such a case, the possibility of a causal
connection between that injury and the disabling condition could not be ruled out. Id The
Court limited the Blohm holding to situations in which the claimant had made a showing of
a duty-related injury, stating that "[iun short, all that [Blohm] held was that where a claimant
makes a showing of a service-incurred injury, the opposing side must then offer evidence
19801 1001
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history of the aggravation clause.4 9 After Johnson, the availability of a
disability retirement based on the aggravation provision was greatly re-
stricted where the original causation was unclear or outside of duty, de-
spite the more relaxed standard of proof under the 1968 Administrative
Procedure Act.5° The effect of the decision was amply borne out by the
disproving the logical inference that the ensuing disability was the long term result of such
injury." Id The Court buttressed this distinction with the fact that the aggravation provi-
sion of § 4-527(2) was not enacted until after the claimant's appeal to the Commissioners
had been rejected. Id
48. 395 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The Wingo decision was more difficult for the court
to distinguish from Johnson, since, unlike Blohm, it had involved a mental rather than phys-
ical disorder, and had facts similar to the cases under consideration. 282 A.2d at 570-71. In
Wingo, the claimant had alleged that his disabling mental condition resulted from such
factors as a killing he had had to commit in the line of duty, harrassment on the job, anxiety
about the results of a disciplinary proceeding against him, a feeling that the police force was
spying on him, and depression from having been reprimanded by a superior officer. 395
F.2d at 635. The Johnson court was forced to distinguish the two cases by a simple finding
that the Wingo decision had been based upon the first subsection of § 4-527 rather than
upon the aggravation provision of subsection (2) because to find otherwise "would bring this
decision in Wingo into conflict with the language of the statute." 282 A.2d at 571. The court
bolstered this rather circular distinction by mentioning that at least one of the factors alleged
as an on-duty aggravating or causative event by the claimant in Wingo, that of having had
to kill in the line of duty, might have had "lasting traumatic consequences." Id Factors of
the type put forth by the claimants in Johnson were dismissed as "symptoms" rather than
"products of aggravating causes." Id See note 45 supra (factors alleged by petitioners in
Johnson).
49. H.R. REP. No. 892, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). In Lewis v. District of Columbia
Bd. of Appeals & Review, 330 A.2d 253, 255-56 (D.C. 1974), the court of appeals had to
resolve a conflict between the Johnson holding as to the burden of proof in an aggravation
case and the language of the House of Representatives report which had accompanied the
enactment of the aggravation provision. That report expressly stated that the purpose of the
amendment was twofold: "to create an additional category of service-connected disability"
and to "place the burden of proof on the Government that such duty did not aggravate the
injury or disease contracted (it may or may not have been incurred or contracted in the
performance of duty)." H.R. REP. No. 892 supra. The Senate Report did not contain any
mention of the burden of proof. S. REP. No. 2271, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). The court
was able to disregard the House report by finding that since the legislative history was "con-
tradictory" it should look only to the language of the provision itself for guidance. 330 A.2d
at 255. The court examined that language to find that as the "statute requires that the injury
or disease be 'shown to have been aggravated by the performance of duty ...,' [it is]
[n]ecessarily. . .the claimant and not the government who is in the position to make this
showing." Id
50. Pub. L. No. 90-614, 82 Stat. 1203 (1968) (codified at D.C. CODE §§ 1-1501 to -1510.
The Act imposes a substantial evidence requirement before the Board and the reviewing
courts. Hence, the burden on the claimant before the Board was lessened by the Act from
the preponderance of evidence test which had previously been applied. However, if a claim-
ant was unable to meet that burden before the Board, it would be more difficult to prevail
before the court of appeals since the Board's decision need only be supported by substantial
evidence rather than by a clear preponderance of evidence.
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almost immediate decline in disability retirements after the decision.5 By
making it necessary for a claimant to prove his disability by substantial
evidence, rather than requiring the government to establish by a clear pre-
ponderance that a disability was not duty-related, Johnson effectively
eliminated any possibility for fraudulent recovery under the aggravation
clause.
During the same time period that the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals grappled with the interpretation of the disability retirement laws,
the city government also undertook to restrict abuse of those provisions
through certain administrative improvements in the functions of the police
and fire departments, the Board of Surgeons, the Retirement Board, and
the Casualty Investigations branch.52 For instance, the police and fire de-
partments agreed to try to reassign individuals to jobs within their physical
limitations either on a temporary or more permanent basis.53 The Board
of Surgeons attempted to establish explicit medical criteria to determine
whether an injury or disease was incurred in the performance of duty and
agreed to refer claimants to a broad range of experts for medical advice.54
Likewise, the Retirement Board began making its own referrals to outside
experts and also instituted several procedural changes involving documen-
tation of the claimant's condition.55 Finally, the District established a Cas-
ualty Investigations Branch to investigate abuses of sick leave and
disability retirement.56 Mayor Marion Barry observed that these com-
bined efforts of the city, in cooperation with the courts, had produced very
favorable results in increasing the effectiveness of the administration of
police and fire department disability retirements.57
51. Disability retirements among police officers and firefighters peaked in 1969-1970 at
95-99% and began to decline in 1971, the year Johnson was decided. See note 16 supra.
That this overall decline was due in part to the more restrictive approach toward the aggra-
vation provision is illustrated by the decline in disability retirements based on that provision
as opposed to other disability retirements from approximately 80% in the late 1960's to less
than 25% since 1975. 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 209 (Appendix A, letter of Mayor
Marion Barry, Jr.).
52. See id at 209-10.
53. Id at 210.
54. Id
55. Id These procedural changes required the filing of medical reports to the Board no
later than 10 days before review. This would allow ample time for consideration and would
provide documentation for use at later medical reviews. Id
56. Id
57. Id at 209. Barry cited the decrease in disability retirements, the decrease of disabil-
ity retirements based on the aggravation provision, and tightened enforcement of the recov-
ery from disability provision, D.C. CODE § 4-530 (1973 & Supp. 1978), as indicative of the
improvements made in the area of disability retirements. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 11,
at 209-10 (Appendix A, letter of Mayor Marion Barry, Jr.).
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II. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETIREMENT REFORM ACT OF
NOVEMBER 17, 1979
A. The Fightfor a New Bill
During the same time period that these administrative and judicial re-
forms were being instituted in response to abuses of the District's police
and firefighter's pension system, Congress became concerned about the
status of these pension plans.58 In particular, Congress focused upon the
serious funding problems which faced the District after home rule.5 9 The
legacy of congressional management of the District's pension system had
left the newly established home rule government with an unfunded pen-
sion system for police and firefighters and a pension program for teachers
and judges "so inadequate as to be considered unfunded."6
In 1978, the drive to pass a retirement reform act was given considerable
momentum by the retirement of three top police and fire department offi-
cials, all of whom claimed and received on-duty disability retirements
under section 4-527. Police Chief Maurice J. Cullinane was granted a
$31,683 tax-free disability pension because of a circulatory condition 6' in
his left leg which had been injured during 1968 and 1970 demonstra-
62tions. Shortly thereafter, Fire Chief Burton W. Johnson applied for a
disability retirement on the basis of a back injury allegedly received in the
performance of duty.63 After serving on the police force for thirty years,
Assistant Police Chief Tilmon B. O'Bryant requested disability benefits
58. See H.R. 15139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). This legislation did not get beyond the
subcommittee stage "because (the Office of Management and Budget] failed to acknowledge
a Federal responsibility to assist the District in funding retirement benefits granted prior to
home rule." 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 2. See also S. REP. No. 237, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1979). Bills on the issue were again introduced in 1976, 1977, and 1978. See H.R.
12441, H.R. 13467, H.R. 14960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 2465, H.R. 6536, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1813, S. 2316, 95th Cong., 2d Sess (1978).
59. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774.
60. S. REP. No. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979).
61. Cullinane was diagnosed as suffering from "thrombo-phlebitis." D.C. Police Board
Votes to Approve Cullinane's Retirement on Disability, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 1978, § A, at 1, col.
1.
62. Id at 4, col. 2. Cullinane was kicked in the knee on Nov. 5, 1968 by an antiwar
demonstrator. On May 9, 1970, the knee was reinjured by a brick thrown during a demon-
stration. During the period between the injuries and his retirement in January, 1978, Culli-
nane suffered from "frequent and severe episodes of pain and swelling in the left knee that
[had] prevented him from working." Id. at 4, col. 3. The blood clots in his leg were diag-
nosed as "life threatening." Id. at 1, col. 1.
63. District Fire Chief Will Retire, Seek Disability Pension, Wash. Star, Feb. 14, 1978, §
A, at 1, col. 5.
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based on high blood pressure and hypertension.' These three disability
retirements, occurring in quick succession, flooded local newspapers with
indignant editorials and articles critical of the District's pension system.65
Unfortunately, the articles focused on the disproportionate number of dis-
ability retirees on city pensions66 and the corresponding danger to the
city's financial stability,67 but barely touched on the improvements that
had been made in the proportion of disability to service retirements since
1969.68 As might be expected, this unfavorable publicity added fuel to the
congressional debate and hardened Congress's resolve to act quickly to
64. Veteran Police Official Seeks $32,840 Pension, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1978, § C, at 1,
col. 1.
65. See, e.g., Costly Pensions - Fire, Police Disability Payments Escalating, Wash. Post,
Jan. 8, 1978, § A, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Costly Pensions]; When Disability Pay Starts
to Hurt, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1978, § A, at 26, col. 1; City Hall's "Premier Rpoff, Wash. Post,
Feb. 26, 1978, § D, at 6, col. 1.
66. As of January, 1977, 82% of retired police officers and 83% of retired firefighters
were classified as disabled. When Disability Pay Starts to Hurt, supra note 65.
67. Id See 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 660 (report of Edwin F. Boynton, Actuary
for the Wyatt Co., retained by the Senate District Committee to study the District's pension
funding). Boynton reported the following projections of payments that the District would
have to make to annuitants:
Amount as a percent of













* Amounts developed assuming five percent annual salary increases for active roll and four
percent annual starting salary increases for new entrants. Figures assume a number of new
entrants which would maintain the number of members at January, 1976 levels.
** Net payments for the District would be the percentage shown less seven percent to reflect
member contributions to the pay-as-you-go system.
Id at 693.
68. One article mentioned this improvement:
The percentage of disability retirements, which peaked at 97 percent of all those
during the year 1970, has been steadily decreasing and was down to about 60 per
cent last year. Still, few of those who decide to apply for disability are turned
down, according to the board's own figures.
Costly Pensions, supra note 65, at 18, col. 2.
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reform the District's pension system. 69
In 1978, both Houses of Congress finally 70 passed a bill acknowledging a
limited federal responsibility to correct past congressional actions which
had allowed the District of Columbia pension system to remain on an un-
funded, "pay-as-you-go" basis.7 ' The bill also addressed the abuses of dis-
ability retirements which were prevalent under the provisions then in effect
in the District. Reform of the disability provisions was perceived as a nec-
essary adjunct to federal contribution in order to prevent federal funds
from being misused. 72 Surprisingly, however, the 1978 bill was pocket-
vetoed by President Carter, who acknowledged some federal obligation
but contended that Congress had overstated that responsibility and had
not adequately addressed the abuses which occurred by virtue of ineffec-
tive administration of disability provisions.73 Yet, despite the President's
position, Congress remained substantially committed to those reforms74
and adopted them again, virtually unchanged, in 1979.7' This time, Presi-
dent Carter signed the District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act into
69. While lauding the three retirees for their dedicated service to the District, Senator
Thomas F. Eagleton's opening remarks to the 1978 Hearings stated that "the coincidence of
their retirements all within a matter of a few weeks raises the question of whether they are
simply trying to get on the gravy train before Congress acts to correct the obvious abuses in
the retirement systems." 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3. Senator Eagleton went on to
categorize the District's pension system as "far and away the premier rip-off of pensions in
the United States, second to none." Id at 4.
70. Debate over the District's pension system and the extent of Congress' responsibility
to contribute to the establishment of a funded system continued from 1974, see H.R. 15139,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), until 1979, when the District of Columbia Retirement Reform
Act was finally enacted into law. Pub. L. No. 96-122, 93 Stat. 866 (1979). See note 58 supra.
71. H.R. 6536, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1978).
72. This concern was actually legislated into the act itself. Section 145 provided for a
reduction in federal contributions should the District's rate of disability retirements exceed a
certain ceiling. S. CONF. REP. No. 1293, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978); H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 1713, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978).
73. 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 150-51 (President's Memorandum of Disapproval).
President Carter said that his administration was willing to assume a federal obligation of
$462 million over 25 years, but Congress's action would raise that obligation to $1.6 billion
over the same time period. Id at 151. In what he termed Congress's "overstatement" of
federal responsibility, the President felt that the Act failed to take into account abuses of the
disability provisions for which the federal government was not responsible. Id Likewise,
he felt that "[a]lthough the bill's benefit and disability retirement reforms are desirable, its
failure to apply these reforms to current employees constitutes a serious and costly defi-
ciency." Id
74. The 1979 Bill, S. 1037, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), did raise the length of service
required for optional retirement to 25 years and age 50 for future employees. The 20 year
retirement rule remains in effect for those who were currently employed. Id § 203.
75. S. 1037, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The conference report on S. 1037 was agreed
to by the House of Representatives on Nov. 8, 1979. The Senate agreed to the report on
Nov. 9, 1979. See 125 CONG. REC. S16490 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1979).
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law, 76 culminating over five years of discussion and legislation in Con-
gress.
77
B. Ramifications of the Act
Perhaps the primary significance of the Act is its express recognition of a
federal obligation to assist the District of Columbia in financing pension
benefits conferred prior to home rule. 7' However, Title II of the Act also
legislates some significant changes in retirement benefits.79 Recognizing
that abuses of previous disability provisions had contributed heavily to the
increasing costs of the pension system,"° the drafters were convinced that
to be financially sound, the pension structure must be based on a properly
functioning administrative scheme."' Despite the many administrative re-
forms undertaken by the District,82 Congress nevertheless believed that the
"laws themselves must be rewritten . . . to eradicate the potential for
abuse in the future."83 To this end, the Retirement Reform Act of 1979
eliminates the aggravation provision of section 4-527(2) for both current
and newly hired employees.84 The Act continues to permit aggravation
76. Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2.
77. See note 58 supra.
78. S. REP. No. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979). See note 13 supra. The Congres-
sional Budget Office estimated the federal cost of the Act, assuming that there were no exces-
sive police and fire disability retirements, to be $65 million per year beginning in fiscal year
1981 and continuing through fiscal year 2005. S. REP. No. 237, supra, at 75-77. The Act
provides for reduction of the federal contribution whenever the rate of disability retirements
exceeds by two percent a ceiling established by an annual estimation of the cost of disability
retirements of District police officers and firefighters who were hired 90 days after enactment
of the Act and who, therefore, were covered by all of the more stringent disability provisions
therein. Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2, § 145, 93 Stat. 882. The Act requires
the District to develop standards for disability retirements which would include "specific
criteria for determining whether an injury was incurred, or a disease was contracted, in the
performance of duty and whether an injury or disease was aggravated in the performance of
duty" which should be developed in light of the "widest practical use of the medical exper-
tise available to [the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons and the Retirement and Relief
Board]." Id § 213, 93 Stat. 915.
79. Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2, §§ 201-214, 93 Stat. 900-16.
80. S, REP. No. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979).
81. See 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 378-79 (statement of Representative Mazzoli at
the full committee markup on H.R. 6536). See also 125 CONG. REC. S 11267 (daily ed. Aug.
1, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton).
82. See notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra.
83. 125 CONG. REC. S 11267 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1979). Senator Eagleton added that he
"would not support the expenditure of one dollar of Federal money without such reforms."
Id Senators Eagleton and Mathias had introduced the Bill on April 30, 1979. 125 CONG.
REc. S4926 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1979).
84. Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2, § 204, 93 Stat. 902. The reforms
instituted by the Act distinguish between various categories of employees: current retirees,
19801 1007
Catholic University Law Review
claims for on-duty injuries but imposes reporting requirements for such
injuries to facilitate later proof.85 The aggravation provision of section 4-
527(2) was generally regarded by Congress as the primary vehicle of abuse
of the pension system 86 and the majority of those testifying at House and
Senate hearings on proposed pension reforms supported its abolition.
8 7
Despite its "potential" for abuse,88 however, the elimination of the aggra-
vation provision will curtail access to on-duty disability retirement and
preclude some justified claims for disability retirement benefits. Judicial
and administrative reforms already undertaken, coupled with additional
reforms contained within the Retirement Reform Act itself, will further
curb abuse. Repeal of the aggravation provision is an overbroad attempt
to decrease costs because it necessarily takes away legitimate grounds for
on-duty disability retirement.
Elimination of the aggravation provision for current employees has
other costs as well. One of the most difficult problems facing the Retire-
ment Board and reviewing courts has been to assign on- or off-duty status
to cases of psychological disability in which the claimant had a preexisting
vulnerability to such condition which was either triggered or exacerbated
by on-the-job factors.8 9 In such cases, involving mixed causation or inor-
current employees, and new hires. The reason behind what is in effect a dual pension system
is the recognition that the "legitimate expectations" of those employees hired prior to the
reform should be honored. 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 9 (remarks of Mayor Walter E.
Washington). See also 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (remarks of Senator Eagleton) ("the
Federal Government must recognize an obligation to the employees covered by these plans,
most of whom were hired before home rule. Any pension plan changes must be fair and
equitable to current employees and retirees, and must not create dissension."). A "new hire"
is a person who first became a member of the police or fire department "after the end of the
ninety-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of the District of Columbia Re-
tirement Reform Act." Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2, § 205, 93 Stat. 905.
Other sections specifically providing for new hires use the same criteria. See, e.g., §§ 201,
204, 93 Stat. 900.
85. Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2, § 204(2), 93 Stat. 903 (1979).
86. S. REP. No. 237, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979).
87. See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 181 (statement of Donald Randall, Metro-
politan Police Officials Ass'n); 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 265 (statement of David A.
Ryan, Fire Fighters Ass'n of the District of Columbia); 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 205
(statement of Mayor Walter Washington). But see 1979 Hearings, supra note 11, at 200
(statement of John Markuns, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers) (no need to eliminate provision,
courts are stemming abusive application); 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 184-85 (statement
of Joseph S. Goldring, Police Ass'n of the District of Columbia) ("strenuously opposes"
reduction of benefits and repeal of aggravation clause).
88. See note 83 and accompanying text supra.
89. See Morgan v. District of Columbia Police & Fireman's Retirement & Relief Bd.,
370 A.2d 1322, 1325 (D.C. 1977); Stoner v. District of Columbia Police & Fireman's Retire-
ment & Relief Bd., 368 A.2d 524, 531 (D.C. 1977). For an analysis of the problem and the
court's solutions in these two cases, see Casenote, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 653 (1978).
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ganic disabilities in which it is difficult or impossible to pinpoint the initial
cause(s), elimination of the aggravation clause will significantly curtail the
Retirement Board and reviewing court's ability to grant section 4-527 re-
tirements. Formerly, the Board simply required proof that the disabling
condition had been aggravated by on-duty factors.9" Now, however, with-
out the aggravation provision, decisionmakers will either arbitrarily have
to assign causation to on-duty factors or deny an on-duty pension for lack
of proof.
Judicial decisions prior to the 1979 repeal of the aggravation provision
illustrate the difficulty of assigning an on- or off-duty status to a psycholog-
ical condition. In Stoner v. District of Columbia Police & Fireman's Retire-
ment & Relief Board,9 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
attempted to apply the "caused or aggravated" language of section 4-
527(2)92 to mental or emotional disabilities which "appear[ed] to be the
product of both a service-related trauma . . . and the individual officer's
particular personality characteristics." 93 The difficulty arose because of
the impossibility of ascertaining absolute causal relationships in the realm
of a purely psychiatric disorder.94 To resolve this dilemma, the court ap-
plied a "but for" analysis,95 finding that "it was not petitioner's general
psychological vulnerability which disabled him, but rather the accident-
induced realization of the apparently underlying potential." 96
The court of appeals refined its "but for" approach when again con-
fronted with a problem of mixed causation in Morgan v. District of Colum-
bia Police & Fireman's Retirement & Relief Board.9 7  There, the court
applied a balancing test to determine the relative causative significance of
the preexisting and duty-related circumstances which contributed to the
disability.9" The court held that relief may not be denied solely on the
90. D.C. CODE § 4-527(2) (1973 & Supp. 1978).
91. 368 A.2d 524 (D.C. 1977).
92. D.C. CODE § 4-527(2) (1973 & Supp. 1978). See note 21 supra.
93. 368 A.2d at 528.
94. Id at 528 n.7 ("The problem with the statutory standard is that it contemplates the
sort of clear and absolute causal relationships which are antithetical to the psychiatric sci-
ences.").
95. Id at 530 ("... but for the accident, petitioner would have been able to continue
with his normal police functions.").
96. Id In Stoner, the claimant was struck by a camper vehicle while on motorcycle
patrol. He sustained "multiple fractures and other serious injuries." Id at 526. Despite
complete physical recovery, he was never again fit for active police duty, due to "post-trau-
matic neurosis" and "hysterical conversion reaction." Id at 527 n. 4.
97. 370 A.2d 1322 (D.C. 1977). In Morgan, the claimant suffered from conversion reac-
tion or psychoneurosis. Id at 1324.
98. Id at 1325.
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finding that the officer had a "preexisting potential for psychological disa-
bility" and, conversely, that a mere showing that an on-duty trauma con-
tributed to the disability is not conclusive.99 The balancing test adopted in
Morgan required that "in light of the humane purpose of the legislation, a
denial of benefits should be based upon a proper determination that the
causative significance of the preexisting or extrinsic circumstances contrib-
uting to the disability clearly outweighs that of the on-duty events or con-
ditions.'' " Yet, the court was obviously not completely satisfied by this
balancing approach since it mentioned that it was awaiting legislative gui-
dance.' Until such guidance was forthcoming, however, the court was
inclined to give a claimant the benefit of a liberal construction of the disa-
bility provisions where causation was questionable, stopping short of rein-
stating the presumption that there was a connection between the on-duty
trauma and the disability.
10 2
But, far from responding to the court's plea for legislative guidance, 10 3
the Retirement Reform Act of 1979 will create additional difficulties where
the court or Retirement Board recognizes a legitimate claim since it must
find that causation rests with on-duty factors in order to grant retirement
under section 4-527. "° In addition to cases involving purely psychological
disabilities, the elimination of the aggravation provision will serve to pre-
clude some retirements justified under section 4-527 in situations involving
factors such as stress and poor working conditions,0 5 where the claimant
may or may not have had a pre-existing tendency toward the condition
which was clearly aggravated by on-duty factors. 0 6 For example, an of-
ficer may merit a disability retirement after suffering a heart attack. While
on-the-job tension and stress may have triggered the attack, the tendency
toward heart trouble may result from nonwork-related factors such as
99. Id
100. Id The general process of proof outlined by the court in cases of mixed or obscure
causation involved three steps: (I) the claimant must show a connection between his duty
and the disability; (2) the government may counter this with "strong and credible evidence
that external factors played a medically signficant role"; and (3) if the government makes
this showing, the claimant must demonstrate the "relative causative importance of the on-
duty events or conditions." Id at 1325-26 n.4.
101. Id. at 1325.
102. Id at 1325 n.4.
103. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
104. The Act imposes reporting requirements which will force the court to deny these
claims since the claimant is required to have reported the on-duty disease or injury within a
specified time after its occurrence in order to preserve a right to have it classified as "on-
duty." Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2 § 204(2), 93 Stat. 903.
105. See notes 5-8 and accompanying text supra.
106. See examples cited in 1978 Hearings, supra note 1, at 152, 184-85.
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obesity, family history, smoking, or diet.'° 7 In the absence of the aggrava-
tion provision, which would have allowed an on-duty retirement where
such factors were shown to exist provided an on-duty "triggering" was
shown, such a claimant will now be unable to recover for on-duty disabil-
ity even where he can meet the burden of proving that the on-duty factors
clearly outweigh any preexisting condition. Thus, disability claimants who
might never have become disabled but for duty-related factors will be pre-
cluded from retiring under section 4-527 and will be forced to accept the
lesser benefits of an off-duty disability under section 4-526.
The creation of new problems of interpretation in cases involving mixed
causation, and the inequities which will result when justified on-duty disa-
bility claims are rejected, renders the repeal of the aggravation clause a
costly remedy for past abuses. This is particularly true in light of the de-
cline in the proportion of disability retirements to service retirements'0 8
and the even greater decrease in disability retirements based on aggrava-
tion in relation to other disability retirements. 0 9 This decline may be at-
tributed to two factors: the shift of the burden of proof to claimants in
aggravation cases" 0 and administrative measures undertaken by the Dis-
trict. ' Even further, the Retirement Reform Act of 1979 imposes a par-
tial disability concept" 2 which will serve to augment the judicial and
administrative reforms in reducing the potential for abuse, and its inclu-
sion in the Act is yet another reason why the aggravation provision need
not have been repealed. Under this provision, the Board of Surgeons is to
determine the percentage of mental or physical impairment suffered by a
claimant. The Retirement Board will use that figure, as well as other fac-
tors,t 3 in determining the percentage of disability to be used in calculating
the amount of annuity the retiree will receive." 4 This provision means
107. 1978 Hearings, supra note I, at 184-85 (statement of Joseph S. Goldring, President,
Police Ass'n of the District of Columbia).
108. See note 16 supra.
109. In 1971, disability retirements based on the aggravation clause accounted for 78% of
all disability retirements. By 1977, that figure had declined to 21%. 1979 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 200 (statement of John Markuns, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers). See also id at 209
(Appendix A, letter of Mayor Marion Barry, Jr.) (since 1975, aggravation retirements less
than 25% of all disability retirements).
110. See notes 42-51 and accompanying text supra.
11l. See notes 52-57 and accompanying text supra.
112. Retirement Reform Act of 1979, supra note 2, § 204, 93 Stat. 902-04.
113. These factors include the nature of the disability, the claimant's age, years of serv-
ice, position, and ability to earn other income. Id
114. At a minimum, an annuitant under this section will receive 40% of his base salary at
the time of retirement if injured on-duty. There is a 30% minimum for annuitants injured
off-duty. Id
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that disability retirements will now be be tailored to the needs and merits
of individual claimants. The Retirement Board may now utilize a more
flexible approach for weighing and allocating the possible causes of disa-
bility. Partial disability determinations will also serve as a disincentive for
only marginally disabled claimants to take advantage of a disability retire-
ment, since full disability retirements will no longer be granted for such
retirees.
III. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act of 1979 represents a
major step toward the establishment of a financially and administratively
sound pension system for police officers, firefighters, teachers, and judges.
It recognizes the need to maintain a funded system which will assure city
employees that their families will be financially secure in the event of
death or disability. The extent of the Act's impact on the administration of
disability claims will to some extent depend upon the effect that measures
such as the percentage disability provision will have in practice. While it is
certain that the reforms undertaken by the Act will serve to reduce the
possibility that the disability provisions will be abused, the repeal of the
aggravation provision was an overreaction to vociferous public pressure
and the history of past abuses. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
had already modified the interpretation of that provision to restrict abusive
applications. Likewise, the District government had imposed various ad-
ministrative reforms to tighten both the application of the provision and
the enforcement of the recovery-from-disability provision. These admini-
strative and judicial reforms had a substantial effect upon the number of
disability retirements granted in the District. In addition, the Act itself
imposes a percentage-of-disability provision which will serve as a disincen-
tive to those who might otherwise have been tempted to make fraudulent
disability claims. In combination with the judicial and administrative
measures already in effect, the repeal of the aggravation provision must be
viewed as an unnecessary sacrifice of a valid basis of disability retirement.
This will preclude some disabled employees from obtaining an on-duty
disability retirement even though they might never have become disabled
had they chosen to pursue a less hazardous career.
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